Abstract. The Duggan-Schwartz theorem [Duggan and Schwartz, 1992 ] is a famous result concerning strategy-proof social choice correspondences, often stated as "A social choice correspondence that can be manipulated by neither an optimist nor a pessimist has a weak dictator". However, this formulation is actually due to Taylor [2002], and the original theorem, at face value, looks rather different. In this note we show that the two are in fact equivalent.
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i P´i is obtained from profile P by replacing P i with P 1 i . A social choice correspondence produces a nonempty set of alternatives, F : PpV, Aq Ñ 2 A zt H u. Definition 1.2. Let H ‰ W Ď A. We use bestpP i , W q to denote the best alternative in W according to P i , worstpP i , W q the worst.
We extend ľ i into two weak orders over 2 A zt H u:
(1) X ľ A social choice correspondence is strategy-proof for optimists (SPO) if for all P 1 i , whenever F pP i P´iq " W and F pP
A social choice correspondence is strategy-proof for pessimists (SPP) if for all P 1 i , whenever F pP i P´iq " W and F pP
Definition 1.3. Given a social choice correspondence F , a weak dictator is some i P V such that the first choice of i is always in F pP q.
Proofs
Theorem 2.1 (Taylor [2002] 
The notion of manipulation used by Duggan and Schwartz is obviously more general than that of Taylor, and one is thus tempted to conclude that the original theorem is weaker than Taylor's reformulation.
1
However, this would be erroneous as the theorems, strictly speaking, are incomparable. Taylor's theorem concerns a social choice correspondence F , whereas Duggan and Schwartz's theorem applies to F together with a set of probability functions, p i . It is entirely plausible that one could find two sets of probability functions such that F and p 1 , . . . , p n satisfy the hypotheses of the Duggan-Schwartz theorem while F and p 1 1 , . . . , p 1 n do not. However, F is unchanged -it either has a weak dictator, or it does not.
To more properly compare the two theorems, then, we need to take an existential projection over the original Duggan-Schwartz theorem.
Theorem 2.3 (Duggan and Schwartz [1992] ). Let F be a social choice correspondence that is onto with respect to singletons. That is, for every a P A there exists a P such that F pP q " t a u.
Suppose there exist probability functions p i : PpV, AqˆAˆ2 A Ñ r0, 1s such that ř xPX p i pP, x, Xq " 1 and p i pP, a, Xq ą 0 whenever a " bestpP i , Xq or a " worstpP i , Xq.
Suppose further that for every u i consistent with P i (u i paq ą u i pbq whenever a ą i b), and for every P 1 i , the following is true: ÿ xPF pPiP´iq
For |A| ě 3, F has a weak dictator.
Now we claim the two theorems are equivalent.
Proposition 2.4. F satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 2.1 if and only if F satisfies the hypotheses of Theorem 2.3.
Proof. We will first show that if F is manipulable in the sense of Taylor it is manipulable in the sense of Duggan-Schwartz. Pay heed to the order of the quantifiers in Theorem 2.3, as they may appear counter-intuitive: F is strategy-proof if for some choice of probability functions, for every choice of a utility function, voter i cannot improve his expected utility. Hence, F is manipulable just if for every choice of probability functions we can construct some utility function giving voter i a profitable deviation. Suppose i can manipulate optimistically from P i P´i to P 1 i P´i. That is:
Now, let p i be any probability function in the sense of Theorem 2.3. Note that this means that p i pP, a, Xq " ǫ and p i pP, b, Y q " δ are strictly positive. Let c P X be the next-best alternative after a. Observe that an upper bound on the utility voter i obtains sincerely is ǫu i paq`p1´ǫqu i pcq, whereas the lower bound on the utility voter i obtains from the deviation is δu i pbq. All we need to do is pick a u i that satisfies:
It is of course easy to do so as, necessarily, u i pbq ą u i paq, u i pcq, and ǫ, δ are constants. For example, let u i paq " 1, u i pcq " 2 and u i pbq " 3 {δ.
Suppose i can manipulate pessimistically from P i P´i to P 1 i P´i. That is:
As before, let p i be any probability function in the sense of Theorem 2.3. This means that p i pP, a, Xq " ǫ and p i pP, b, Y q " δ are strictly positive. Let c P X be the best alternative in the set. Observe that an upper bound on the utility voter i obtains sincerely is ǫu i paq`p1´ǫqu i pcq, whereas the lower bound on the utility voter i obtains from the deviation is u i pbq.
2 All we need to do is pick a u i that satisfies:
This time it is possible that u i pcq ą u i pbq, however 1´ǫ is strictly smaller than 1. One possibility is u i paq " 1, u i pbq "
1´ǫ . This leads to the following inequality, which can be verified algebraically:
Now suppose that F is manipulable in the sense of Duggan-Schwartz. This means for every choice of p i , there is some choice of u i such that for some choice of P i P´i and P 1 i P´i, i's expected utility is higher in the insincere profile.
Pick a p i that attaches a probability of 1 {2 to the best alternative in the set and 1 {2 to the worst. In other words, we have the following situation:
F pP i P´iq " X, F pP 1 i P´iq " Y, bestpP i , Xq " x 1 , bestpP i , Y q " y 1 , worstpP i , Xq " x 2 , worstpP i , Y q " y 2 , u i px 1 q`u i px 2 q 2 ă u i py 1 q`u i py 2 q 2 .
Clearly, a necessary condition for the above to hold is that either u i py 1 q ą u i px 1 q or u i py 2 q ą u i px 2 q. That is to say, F is manipulable by either an optimist or a pessimist.
